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Previous studies have shown that test anxiety is related to attention bias. It is not 
clear, however, whether a congruent test-threat manipulation is required to elicit this bias or 
whether the bias is a result of automatic or conscious processes. In the present study we used 
a mood induction procedure to examine attention bias in test anxious persons using a dot-
probe task and incorporated approach-avoidance temperament as a possible moderator. 
Results showed that the mood induction procedure was not effective in manipulating state 
anxiety. In the absence of an effective test-threat manipulation, high test anxious persons 
showed attention bias towards supraliminal threat stimuli. Attention bias was only shown to 
subliminal threat stimuli in high test anxious persons with a strong approach temperament. 
This suggests that the mechanism for attention bias to threat stimuli in high test anxious 
persons is a result of both automatic and conscious processes.  
Keywords: Test anxiety, attention bias, approach-avoidance temperament,   




Attention bias refers to greater allocation of information processing resources to one 
type of stimuli relative to another (Macleod & Mathews, 1988; McLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986). Many studies have shown that persons with clinical or high trait anxiety show a bias 
towards threat stimuli, relative to neutral stimuli, and relative to individuals with low anxiety 
(e.g., Abend et al., 2017; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & van 
IJzendoorn, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010). There is a small body of evidence to show that an 
attention bias may also be present in individuals with high test anxiety (Dong, De Beuckelaer, 
Yu, & Zhou, 2017; Jastrowski, Mano, Gibler, & Beckmann, 2018; Putwain, Langdale, 
Woods, & Nicholson, 2012; Vasey, El-Hag, & Daleiden, 1996; Zhang, Dong, & Zhou, 2018). 
Within this nascent body of work, however, it is not clear whether a congruent test-threat 
condition is required to produce the attention bias, whether attention bias to test-threat stimuli 
is a result of automatic or conscious processes, and whether, in test anxious persons, attention 
bias is towards or away from threat. The present study used a dot-probe task to assess 
attention bias under test-threat (writing about one’s last examination) and test-neutral (writing 
about one’s journey to college) conditions. To differentiate between automatic or conscious 
processes we used subliminal (indicative of automatic processing) and supraliminal 
(indicative of conscious processing) presentation of stimuli. Finally, approach-avoidance 
temperament was included as a moderator to examine the possibility that attention bias may 
be amplified in individuals with a stronger avoidance temperament.  
Test Anxiety 
Test anxiety is a situational-specific form of trait anxiety referring to enduring 
differences in the tendency to appraise evaluative situations as threatening (Spielberger & 
Vagg, 1995; Szafranski, Barrera & Norton, 2012). Persons with high test anxiety will 
typically experience negative self-related worry cognitions (e.g., ‘If I fail this exam, my 
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whole life will be a failure’) and elevated autonomic activity (e.g., increased heart-rate) in 
situations where one’s performance will be evaluated, such as academic tests and 
examinations (Zeidner, 2007, 2014). According to Attentional Control theory (Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2011; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) worrisome cognitions interfere 
with working memory processes (e.g., updating and shifting) and hence could be detrimental 
to examination performance. Meta-analyses have confirmed a negative relationship between 
the cognitive (worry) aspect of test anxiety and educational achievement (e.g., Chappell et al., 
2005; von der Embse, Jester, Roy, & Post, 2018). Furthermore, working memory capacity is 
adversely impacted by worry (Putwain, Shah & Lewis, 2014) and has been shown to mediate 
relations between worry and test performance (Owens, Stevenson, & Hadwin, 2012; Owens, 
Stevenson, Norgate, & Hadwin, 2008). The focus of attentional resources in test anxious 
persons on worrisome cognitions at the expense of the task at hand suggests the likely role of 
an influential cognitive mechanism (also see Keogh & French, 2001; Schutz, Davis, & 
Schwanenflugel, 2002).  
In England, where this study was conducted, compulsory standardised National 
Curriculum Tests (NCTs) are taken by students aged 11 years in their final year of primary 
school. Compulsory secondary school exit examinations (General Certificate of Secondary 
Education: GCSE exams) are taken by students aged 16 years (see Shackleton, 2014). In 
addition, Certificate of Secondary Education: Advanced Level examinations (A Level) are 
taken by those students, aged 18 years, following an academic route at the end of upper 
secondary education. GCSE and A Level results are used partly by individual students, to 
meet requirements for future employment, education, and training, and partly for 
accountability purposes to judge school and teacher effectiveness. NCTs are used solely for 
accountability purposes. Schools are heavily incentivised to maximise student test and 
examination performance through the use of sanctions (which include school closure and 
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replacement of school management) and ranking schools in a particular locality by student 
performance (referred to colloquially, using a sporting analogy, as school ‘league tables’) 
(see Perryman, Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2011; Roberts & Abreu, 2016). These are not 
concerns unique to England; a recent survey reported that student performance data was used 
in teacher evaluations widely across the twenty-three countries studied (OECD, 2013).  
In England, however, there has been increasing concern from teachers, parents, 
charities, and psychologists that the pressures resulting from the accountability by high-stakes 
testing policies on children and young people have become dangerously high. There is 
serious concern about their contribution to poor wellbeing (Cowburn & Blow, 2017), and 
exacerbation of poor mental health (Rodway et al., 2016). There is an increasing urgency to 
understand the causes and conditions that give rise to high levels of test anxiety and to 
develop and evaluate evidence-based interventions and treatments for test anxiety. One 
relatively under-studied cause of test anxiety is bias in information processing such as 
attention bias; the focus of the present study. This is a fruitful line of research, partly as 
interventions designed to reverse such biases (attentional bias modification) have shown 
promising results (e.g., Hayes, Hirsch & Mathews, 2010; See, MacLeod & Bridle, 2009) and 
partly as they are relatively straightforward to implement. Before such interventions are 
developed for test anxiety, however, it is first necessary to build the evidence base that test 
anxiety may be underpinned by information processing biases.  
Attention Bias 
A robust finding in the literature is that highly anxious persons show an information-
processing bias towards the processing of threat stimuli over neutral stimuli (e.g., Abend et 
al., 2017; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010). Such a bias may manifest as the 
allocation of attention resources to differing or competing sources of stimuli. For instance, 
when experimentally presented with two stimuli simultaneously, such as one threat word (e.g. 
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cancer) and one neutral word (e.g. chair), highly anxious persons respond more quickly to a 
probe spatially replacing the threat word (compared with a probe replacing the neutral word) 
than non-anxious persons (these types of tasks are referred to in the literature as ‘dot-probe’ 
tasks). This phenomenon of attention bias has been demonstrated in over 172 studies 
revealing an average effect size of d =.45 (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Furthermore, a similar 
magnitude of attention bias is reliably detected in a variety of clinical anxiety disorders and 
also in non-clinical persons reporting elevated trait vulnerability to anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007). 
Attention bias, therefore, represents a core component of elevated anxiety (Cisler & 
Koster, 2010). Experimental tasks, using modified dot-probe tasks, where probes always 
follow the location of a threat word, have provided reliable evidence that attention bias can 
play a causal role in anxiety and worry vulnerability (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; MacLeod, 
Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy & Holker, 2002). Furthermore, attention bias modification 
studies where the probe replaces the prior location of the neutral word have shown that it is 
possible to reduce anxiety by reducing attention bias to threat stimuli (e.g., Hayes, Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2010; See, MacLeod, & Bridle, 2009) providing further evidence for the causal 
role of attention bias.  
Attention Bias and Test Anxiety 
 In comparison to the general anxiety literature few studies have specifically examined 
attention bias in test anxiety. As we noted earlier, test anxiety is conceptualised as a situation-
specific form of trait anxiety (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995). Whereas a person high in (general) 
trait anxiety might be expected to respond to a variety of threat situations with elevated state 
anxiety, persons high in test anxiety would only respond with elevated state anxiety to 
performance-evaluative situations. Nonetheless, we would expect the same attention 
processing mechanisms that underpin trait anxiety to underpin test anxiety. The worries 
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experienced by highly test anxious persons and the interfering nature of these cognitions on 
information processing (e.g., Keogh & French, 2001; Schutz et al., 2002) is indicative of 
vigilance towards, and/ or disengagement from, threat stimuli. Furthermore, attention bias to 
threat has also been shown in mathematics anxiety (Rubinsten, Eidlin, Wohl, & Akibli, 2015) 
providing evidence that attention bias can be shown in a situation-specific trait; like test 
anxiety, mathematics anxiety is a situation-specific trait anxiety. 
Vasey et al. (1996) used a dot-probe task to assess attention bias to emotionally 
threatening words comprised of social (including evaluative threat) and physical threats in 
middle school students aged 11-14 years. Results showed that high test anxious students 
showed a bias towards threat stimuli. Putwain et al., (2011) used a dot-probe task to measure 
attention bias in undergraduates to test-threat word stimuli (relative to neutral stimuli) in test-
threat and test-neutral conditions. Attention bias was shown to test-threat stimuli under the 
corresponding test-threat condition, but not under the test-neutral condition. Also using a dot-
probe task, Jastrowski et al., (2018) and Zhang et al. (2018) found that undergraduate 
students showed an attention bias to pictorial and verbal stimuli, respectively. 
Zhang et al. (2018) also found brain activity consistent with a shift of attention to the 
processing of threat stimuli when participants were presented with threat stimuli, although 
this was not sustained over the course of the 288 trials. Dong et al. (2017) used a novel eye-
tracking approach to study how undergraduates orientate to test-threat pictorial stimuli. Over 
the course of 48 pairs of stimuli (threat and neutral pictures presented for 3s), high test 
anxious persons initially attended to the threat stimuli before attending away from threat 
stimuli as the trials progressed. Relatedly, attention bias to general academic threat stimuli 
was shown in a dot-probe task by high school-anxious students aged 12-15 years that was 
magnified when students felt rejected (Scrimin, Moscardino, Altoè & Mason, 2017). These 
findings provide evidence that high test anxious persons show an attention bias. The findings 
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of Dong et al. (2018) question whether attention bias in test anxiety is towards or away from 
threat. 
Attention bias to threat stimuli could occur within anxious individuals during early 
(automatic) and/ or late (strategic) stages of information processing. For instance, attention 
bias to threat for high anxious persons is shown when stimulus presentations are subliminal 
(e.g., 100ms presentation times or 50ms presentation time, followed by a 450ms mask made 
up of a nonsense word) which implies an early or automatic stage of information processing 
that is effortless, unintentional, and free of conscious control (Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 
1995; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997). Highly anxious persons can also show 
attention bias towards, and sometimes away from, threat when stimulus presentations are 
supraliminal (e.g., 500ms presentation times) which implies late or strategic stage of 
information processing that is effortful, intentional, and conscious (Cooper & Langton, 2006; 
Dalgleish et al., 2003) either alone or in conjunction with automatic processes (see Williams, 
Watts,  MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). 
In the general anxiety literature there are theories that account for attention bias in 
early and late-stage information processing. In the test anxiety literature, the only theory to 
account for biased information processing is the self-referent executive processing model 
(Zeidner & Matthews, 2005). This model proposes vigilance for threat (an automatic process) 
as a contributory factor to the maintenance of test anxiety. Somewhat paradoxically, of the 
studies conducted on test anxiety to date, none have examined the automated stage of 
processing. Accordingly, in the present study we include varying stimuli presentation times in 
a dot-probe task to differentiate the stage of processing; subliminal presentation to ascertain 
whether attention bias is automatic and supraliminal to establish whether attention bias is at 
least in part strategic. There is also inconsistency in the literature over whether a congruent 
test threat situation is required to elicit attention bias. Some studies have shown that attention 
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bias to threat stimuli is only shown when state anxiety is increased from baseline (e.g., Fox, 
Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Putwain et al., 2012) whereas other studies have shown that 
elevated state anxiety is not required for highly trait anxious persons to show an attention bias 
to threat stimuli (e.g., Abend et al., 2017; Vasey et al., 1996). A mood induction procedure, 
based on the autobiographical emotional memory task (e.g., Allen, Schaefer & Falcon, 2014; 
Schaefer & Philippot, 2005), was used in the present study as a means to establish whether a 
congruent threat situation was required to elicit attention bias in high test anxious persons. 
Specifically, we asked participants to either write about their journey to college (test-neutral) 
or their last examination (test-threat).  
This mood induction procedure was chosen in part for theoretical, and in part for 
practical reasons. Since test anxiety is known to negatively impact on working memory 
performance (e.g., Owens et al., 2008, 2012; Putwain et al., 2014) it is possible that high 
levels of test anxiety could also interfere with performance on the dot-probe task. It would 
therefore be beneficial to induce test anxiety using a less cognitively demanding task than an 
IQ-type test used in previous research (e.g., Putwain et al., 2011). From a practical 
perspective, we intended to use group testing of participants and host all instructions, 
materials and data collection online. The presentation and instructions for the mood induction 
were straightforward to present in this fashion and link anonymously with dot-probe and 
questionnaire data. Although several test providers offer online versions of IQ and ability 
type tests, this would require switching from our research webpage to the test provider 
webpage and participants providing identifying details to link responses.  
Approach-avoidance Temperament 
As we noted above, evidence from Dong et al., (2018) questions whether high test 
anxiety involves attention bias away from threat. One basic individual difference variable that 
might impact on anxious persons’ processing of threat stimuli is approach-avoidance 
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temperament. Approach temperament is defined as sensitivity towards real or imagined 
positive stimuli, such as reward, and avoidance temperament as sensitivity towards real or 
imagined negative stimuli, such as threat (Elliot & Thrash, 2010). Approach-avoidance 
temperament integrates trait (e.g., neuroticism and extroversion), affective dispositions 
(positive and negative emotionality), and motivational (e.g., behavioural activation and 
inhibition), approaches to personality within a unified framework (Elliot & Thrash, 2002). 
Elliot and Thrash (2010) propose that approach temperament focuses attention on positive, 
and avoidance temperament on negative, stimuli increasing the amount of positive or 
negative information being processed and subsequently influencing one’s affective state (also 
see Briki, 2018; Elliot & Sheldon, 1997). 
It is likely that, to some degree, test anxiety and a tendency towards avoidance 
temperament would co-occur (e.g., Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Putwain & Symes, 2012). Test 
anxiety, however, is a multi-causal phenomenon (Zeidner & Matthews, 2005); an individual 
could still become highly test anxious due to poor competence beliefs, poor coping strategies, 
metacognitive beliefs that exacerbate worry, self-handicapping, and emotion regulation 
strategies, independently of their avoidance temperament. It is likely that highly test anxious 
persons who differ in their approach-avoidance temperament would also differ in their 
attention bias (see Spielberg, Heller, Silton, Stewart, Miller, 2011). Specifically, the attention 
bias towards threat in highly test anxious persons with a strong avoidance temperament (i.e., 
those with a tendency to focus on and process negative stimuli) would be greater than highly 
test anxious persons with a weaker avoidance temperament or a stronger approach 
temperament (i.e., those with a tendency to focus on and process positive stimuli). In short, 
approach-avoidance temperament might moderate the relation between test anxiety and 
attention bias. 
Aim of the Present Study 
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 The aim of the present study was threefold. First, it was to examine whether a 
congruent test-threat condition is required to demonstrate an attention bias towards threat 
using a mood induction procedure. Second, it was to establish whether attention bias to threat 
in high test anxious persons occurred during automatic or strategic stages of information 
processing using subliminal and supraliminal presentation of stimuli. Third, it was to examine 
whether approach-avoidance temperament moderated the relation between test anxiety and 
attention bias. Attention bias represents a core cognitive mechanism underpinning anxiety 
(Abend et al., 2017; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010) and worrisome cognitions 
have been shown to be the component of test anxiety most strongly related to information 
processing interference (e.g., Keogh & French, 2001; Schutz, & Schwanenflugel, 2002; von 
der Embse et al. 2018). Following previous studies (e.g., Putwain et al., 2011), we chose to 
focus solely on the cognitive (worry) component of test anxiety. 
The following three hypotheses were tested: 
H1: High test anxious persons will show an attention bias to test-threat stimuli relative to test-
neutral stimuli. This bias will be stronger under a congruent threat condition.  
H2: Attention bias to threat in high test anxious persons will be observable at both early (sub-
threshold) and late stages of processing. 




The study used a mixed design with two between-participants IVs and one within-
participants IV. The two between-participants IVs were test-threat vs. test-neutral conditions 
and high vs. low exam-related test anxiety. The test-threat vs. test-neutral condition was 
manipulated by randomly allocating participants to a writing task where they were asked to 
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describe either their last examination (test-threat) or journey to college (test-neutral). Test 
anxiety was quasi-manipulated into low and high groups using a median split. The within-
participants IV was a measurement of state anxiety taken before and after the writing task. 
Participants 
 There were 186 participants (male = 44, female = 142), drawn from three English 6th 
Form Colleges, who were all in their first year of studying for a General Certificate of 
Education: Advanced Level in Psychology along with two other subjects. 6th Form is a tier of 
upper secondary education (ages 16-19 years) where students typically study university 
entrance qualifications in academic subjects or vocational equivalents. The mean age of 
participants was 16.4 years (SD = .57) and the ethnic heritage was as follows: Asian = 27, 
Black = 17, White = 124, other = 14, and mixed heritage = 4. 
Measures 
Test Anxiety. Test anxiety was measured using the 6-item worry scale from the 
Revised Test Anxiety Scale (Hagtvet & Benson, 1997). Participants responded to items (e.g., 
‘During exams I find myself thinking about the consequences of failing’) on a four-point 
scale (1 = almost never, 4 = always). Items were adapted from the original to refer to ‘exams’ 
rather than ‘tests’ in keeping with the parlance of the English educational system. This 
measure has shown construct validity, predictive validity, and internal consistency in 
previous studies (e.g., Putwain & Aveyard, 2018; Putwain & Symes, 2011). In the present 
study the internal consistency was good (Cronbach’s α = .74). 
State anxiety. State anxiety was measured using the 6-item short adaption of the state 
anxiety scale from the State-trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI: Marteau & Bekker, 1992). 
Participants responded to items (e.g., ‘I feel calm’) on a four-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = 
very much). This measure has been widely used in a range of clinical, health, and 
experimental settings where it has shown good construct validity, predictive validity, and 
TEST ANXIETY AND ATTENTION BIAS 12 
 
 
internal consistency (e.g., Bayrampour, McDonald, Fung, & Tough, 2014; Tluczek, 
Henriques, & Brown, 2009). The internal consistency was good (Cronbach’s α pre-writing 
task = .78, post-writing task = .77). 
Attention bias. Attention bias was measured using a dot-probe task that included 24 
word pairs, each of which was presented four times: twice subliminally and twice 
supraliminally. Each word pair consisted of a test-threat word (e.g., failure) and a test-neutral 
word (e.g., television), matched by number of syllables, with one word presented above the 
other (see appendix for list of threat and neutral words). In the subliminal condition, the word 
pair was shown for 100ms and in the supraliminal condition each word pair was shown for 
500ms. 40 test-threat words were initially identified from previous studies (Putwain et al., 
2011; Vasey et al., 1996) and then rated by four experts on a five-point scale in terms of how 
threatening someone with test anxiety would find them, resulting in 24 threat-relevant words 
selected for inclusion in the dot-probe task. Prior to the presentation of each word pair, a 
fixation cue (+++) appeared in the centre of the screen for 500ms, before being replaced by 
the word pair. 
After 100ms (subliminal trials) or 500ms (supraliminal trials), the word pair was 
removed and the probe (an arrow pointing left or right) appeared in the space where one of 
the words had been. Participants were instructed to press the A key on their keyboard if the 
arrow was pointing left (<), and the L key if it was pointing right (>). Participant reaction 
times and accuracy were recorded. Once the participants had pressed either the A or L key, 
the probe would disappear, and that would end one trial. The fixation cue would then appear 
again for 500ms, before the next word pair was presented and so on, with participants 
completing 96 trials in total. The fixation cue, word pairs and probe were all presented in 
black in Arial, font size 12, on a white screen. The trials were presented in the same order for 
all participants. For half of the word pairs, the test-threat word was on the top, and the probe 
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replaced the test-threat word in half of the trials, and the test-neutral word for the other half.  
In addition, on half of the trials the probe pointed left, and on the other half it pointed right. 
Participants completed three practice trials before the main trials began.  
Approach-avoidance Temperament. Approach-avoidance temperament was 
measured by the twelve-item questionnaire developed by Elliot and Thrash (2010). This scale 
contains six items intended to measure avoidance (e.g., ‘I react strongly to bad experiences’) 
and six items intended to measure approach (e.g., ‘Thinking about the things I want really 
energises me’). Participants responded to items on a five-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 3 
= neither, 5 = strongly agree). The construct validity and internal consistency have been 
reported in numerous studies (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2010; Gocłowska, Aldhobaiban, Elliot, 
Murayama, Kobeisy, Abdelaziz, 2017). A higher order factor structure was used in the 
present study in order to model a single score for approach-avoidance temperament. 
Approach and avoidance were represented as first order factors and approach-avoidance 
temperament as the second order factor. The scores of avoidance items were reversed, such 
that a higher score on the second order factor for approach-avoidance temperament 
corresponds to a greater approach temperament and a lower score to a greater avoidance 
temperament. The internal consistency of the combined scale was good (Cronbach’s α = .78). 
Procedure 
Data were collected at three different sites, one for each of the three participating 6th 
Form Colleges. At each 6th Form College, participants were tested in groups ranging from 7 
to 25 in a quiet classroom fitted with multiple PCs. Each participant was seated at their own 
PC approximately one metre either side of the next participant to avoid visual distraction. All 
instructions, tasks, and measures, were hosted on a website. A brief introduction to the study 
was provided by the researcher and, if consent was provided, participants were randomly 
allocated a URL that linked to either the test-threat or test-neutral condition. First, 
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participants completed the six-item state anxiety measure before being prompted to write 
about their last examination (test-threat condition) or journey to college (test-neutral 
condition) and completing the six-item state anxiety measure again. There was a lower limit 
of 200 characters including spaces (no upper limit) for the writing task and participants were 
prompted to continue writing if they attempted to move to the next webpage before 
completing 200 characters. 
Participants were then prompted to undertake the dot-probe task and finally to 
complete the measures for test anxiety and approach-avoidance temperament and 
demographic information. Instructions for the test-threat and test-neutral writing tasks, and 
the dot-probe task are replicated in the appendix. The test-related worry measure was 
completed after the writing and dot-probe tasks to avoid priming highly test-anxious 
participants and potentially confounding the writing tasks. Ethical permission was provided 
from the institutional ethics committee at which the first, third and fourth authors were based 
(Reference: 16/TPL/006). Gatekeeper consent was provided by the Principal of the 
participating colleges and individual consent provided by participants by clicking on an 
‘agree to participate’ button on the instruction page of the project website. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
A manipulation check was conducted using a 2x2x2 mixed ANOVA with one within-
participants factor (before vs. after the writing task) and two between- participants factors 
(threat vs. neutral condition; high vs. low worry) and state anxiety as the dependent variable. 
There was a main effect for worry, F(1,182) = 7.29, p = .008, ηp
2 = .04, whereby state anxiety 
was higher for participants who were high in worry (M = 11.37, SE = .31) compared with 
those who were low in worry (M = 10.19, SE = .32). All other main effects and interactions 
were not statistically significant (ps >.05). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. A 
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possible reason for the failure of the test-threat condition to induce state anxiety is that whilst 
there were a number of references to feeling anxious before (n = 92) and during (n = 49) their 
last exam, the majority of participants ended their accounts with details of the positive 
emotions (n = 70) such as relief (n = 30) and happiness (n = 13). It is possible that this 
positively influenced their perceptions of state anxiety. Fewer students reported feeling 
anxious after they had finished their exam (n = 33).  
[Table 1 about here] 
Attention bias 
During a data screening procedure, individual responses < 20ms and >2000 ms were 
removed, incorrect responses were removed, and 17 participants who had fewer than 80% 
valid trials (n = 17) were removed (i.e. any participant with more than 20% of trials incorrect 
or outside of the indicated time window was removed from all the analyses). An attention 
bias index was calculated by subtracting the reaction time to test-neutral stimuli from the 
reaction time to threat-threat stimuli; a positive score would indicate a bias away from threat 
(i.e., towards the prior location of the neutral word) and a negative score would indicate a 
bias towards threat (i.e., towards the prior location of the threat word). Descriptive statistics 
are reported in Table 1 (standardised factor loadings are reported from the measurement 
model described below). 
[Table 2 here] 
  Data were analysed in a latent interaction structural equation model using the Latent 
Moderated Structural Equations (LMS) approach (Klein & Moosbrugger, 2000). First, a 
measurement model was built to assess the measurement properties of the latent constructs 
and to estimate latent bivariate correlations. The measurement model included six latent 
indicators for Worry and a higher order latent factor for Approach-avoidance temperament 
built from two lower order factors of avoidance and approach (six indicators each). Attention 
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bias index (for subliminal and supraliminal attention bias), gender (0 = male, 1 = female) and 
age were included as manifest variables. Indicators for Worry, Approach-avoidance 
temperament, and attention bias index scores were z-transformed prior to analysis. Model fit 
was assessed using the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Standardized 
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Tucker–Lewis 
index (TLI). A good fitting model is indicated by RMSEA and SRMR indices of <.08 and 
<.06, respectively, and CFI and TLI indices of >.95 (Marsh, Hau, & Grayson 2005). The 
measurement model, and all subsequent analyses were estimated using maximum likelihood 
using the Mplus v.8 software (Muthén & Muthén, 2017).  
[Table 3 about here] 
 By these criteria, the measurement model showed a good fit to the data: χ2(175) = 
182.71 p <.001, RMSEA = .042, SRMR = .039, CFI = .964, and TLI = .955. Latent bivariate 
correlations are reported in Table 3. The latent interaction structural equation modelling 
followed the two-stage approach of Maslowsky, Jager, and Hemken (2015). First, a model of 
the latent constructs that did not contain the interaction term between worry and approach-
avoidance, was built to assess model fit (Model 1). Second, a model including the interaction 
term (Model 2) was tested and the relative advantage over Model 1 assessed by means of the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), sample-size adjusted Bayesian information criterion 
(aBIC), the log likelihood ratio test, and the change in the proportion of variance (ΔR2), 
explained in attention bias. 
[Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 Model 1 regressed subliminal and supraliminal attention bias on Worry, Approach-
avoidance temperament, gender and age, and showed a good fit to the data: χ2(161) = 195.45, 
p =.002, RMSEA = .042, SRMR = .039, CFI = .964, and TLI = .955. The fit of Model was 
not significantly different, χ2(14) = 12.74, p >.05,  from that of the measurement model. 
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Model 2, including the latent interaction term, showed a reduction in AIC (Δ = 3.54) and 
aBIC (Δ = 3.51), indicative of a better fitting model (Hix-Small, Duncan, Duncan, & Okut, 
2004). Furthermore, the log-likelihood ratio test suggested a statistically significant 
improvement for Model 2 over Model 1 (D = 18.97, p <.001) and a greater proportion of 
variance was explained for subliminal attention bias (subliminal: ΔR2= .052, supraliminal: 
ΔR2= .006). Standardised (βs) and unstandardised regression coefficients (Bs) are reported in 
Tables 4 and 5. 
For subliminal attention bias, a statistically significant interaction term was reported 
between Worry and Approach-avoidance temperament (β = -.22, p = .03), which was probed 
with simple slopes at ±1SD (please note that the Mplus software only provides estimates for 
unstandardised regression coefficients for simple slopes). A positive trend was shown 
between Worry and subliminal attention bias at low (-1SD) Approach-avoidance (B = .47, p 
= .26), which became negative at mean Approach-avoidance (B = -.20, p = .39). At high 
(+1SD) Approach-avoidance the negative trend became stronger and statistically significant 
(B = -.87, p = .03). Simple slopes are graphed in Figure 1. At high (+1SD) Worry, those with 
a greater approach tendency (i.e., +1SD Approach-avoidance) showed subliminal attention 
bias towards threat whereas those with a greater avoidance tendency (i.e. -1SD Approach-
avoidance) showed subliminal attention bias away from threat. For supraliminal stimuli, 
Worry was associated with greater attention bias towards threat (β = -.19, p = .01) but did not 
interact with Approach-avoidance. 
[Figure 1 here] 
Discussion 
The aim of the study was threefold. First, to examine whether attention bias to test-
threat stimuli in highly test anxious persons was only shown in a congruent test-threat 
condition. Second, to examine whether attention bias to threat in high test anxious persons 
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occurred during automatic or strategic stages of information processing. Third, to examine 
whether Approach-avoidance temperament moderated relations between test anxiety and 
attention bias. Results showed that the mood induction procedure was not effective in 
manipulating state anxiety. Approach-avoidance temperament moderated relations between 
Worry and subliminal, but not supraliminal attention bias. Unexpectedly, high test anxious 
persons with a greater approach temperament showed a stronger subliminal attention bias 
towards threat. In contrast, high test anxious persons with a greater avoidance temperament 
showed a stronger subliminal attention bias away from threat. High test anxious persons 
showed a supraliminal attention bias towards threat irrespective of their approach-avoidance 
temperament.  
The first aim of our study was to resolve a point of inconsistency arising from the 
nascent body of studies conducted thus far into test anxiety; namely whether attention bias is 
only present in a congruent test-threat condition. The results of our study cannot speak 
conclusively to this aim as the mood induction procedure was not effective in increasing state 
anxiety for high test anxious persons. As a result the study was deprived of a congruent test-
threat condition. Essentially, irrespective of which condition participants were allocated to, 
they were both low threat in respect of tests or examinations. This, perhaps, is not such a 
surprising finding. Studies have shown that writing about one’s worries before a test can 
reduce anxiety (e.g., Donnelly & Murray, 1991; Graf, Gaudiano, & Geller, 2008) and boost the 
performance of highly math and test anxious students (e.g., Park, Ramirez,& Beilock, 2014; 
Ramirez & Beilock, 2011). Although our writing tasks did not occur directly before a test 
(notwithstanding the possibility that some participants might have viewed the dot-probe 
activity in test-like terms) it is possible that writing about a pressured examination in the past 
had a similar effect to prevent the development of state anxiety.  
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Nonetheless, we felt it was important to report these findings. This was partly inspired 
by the file drawer controversy (e.g., Franco, Malhotra, Simonovits, 2014) and we felt 
somewhat obliged to report this statistically non-significant finding where perhaps previously 
we would have been less inclined to do so. This was also partly for the benefit of research 
colleagues who may also be searching for effective ways of artificially creating test-threat 
congruent situations for laboratory research. In respect of the latter point, we would advise 
that the mood induction procedure employed for this study was not effective for creating the 
evaluative threat required for a test anxious congruent threat condition in samples of students 
from upper secondary education (aged 16-19 years). As we highlighted above, it is possible 
that writing about an examination from the past may help to reduce worries. It is notable in 
this respect that participants tended to finish their recollections with mainly positive 
deactivating emotions such as relief (see Pekrun, 2018; Weiner, 2010) rather than anxiety.  A 
somewhat tentative conclusion would be that attention bias towards supraliminal threat can 
be shown without a corresponding test-threat condition. In this respect our findings are in line 
with some previous studies examining attention bias in test anxiety (e.g., Zhang et al., 2018; 
Vasey et al., 1996) and general trait anxiety (e.g., Abend et al., 2017; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; 
Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997).  
The second aim of the study was to establish whether the mechanism underpinning 
attention bias in test anxiety was automatic or strategic. An attention bias shown to the 
subliminal presentation would imply a fast, early, automatic process (e.g., vigilance) whereas 
an attention bias shown to the supraliminal presentation would imply late, strategic processes 
(e.g., difficulty disengaging from threat) were involved (although this does not completely 
rule out the presence of automatic processes).  The results of our study showed an attention 
bias to threat in high test anxious persons was present for the supraliminal presentation of 
test-threat stimuli but not for the subliminal presentation of test-threat stimuli. This offers 
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partial support for H2 and is in line with previous studies showing that persons high in 
(general) trait anxiety show attention bias to supraliminal (e.g., 500ms presentation times) 
threat stimuli (e.g., Cooper & Langton, 2006; Dalgleish et al., 2003; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). 
The third aim of the study was to establish whether attention bias towards threat 
stimuli in high test anxious persons was moderated by approach-avoidance temperament; 
weaker for those with an approach tendency and greater for those with an avoidance 
tendency. Results did not support H3. Rather than showing a stronger attention bias towards 
threat, persons high in cognitive test anxiety with an avoidance temperament showed a 
stronger attention bias away from subliminal threat stimuli. This was an unexpected finding 
as persons high in avoidance temperament should show an orientation to, and a greater 
processing of, negative information. A possible explanation may lie in the tendency for 
persons to down-regulate negative emotion by moving attention away from threat stimuli 
when anxiety becomes overwhelming. 
For instance, studies have shown that clinically anxious and high trait anxious persons 
show an attention bias away from threat when using longer stimulus presentations of 1250ms 
(e.g., Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; Pflugshaupt, Mosimann, 
vonWartburg, Schmitt, Nyffeler, & Muri, 2005). It is possible that a similar mechanism is at 
work in the present study; highly test anxious persons with a strong avoidance temperament 
move attention away from subliminal threat to evade an excess of anxiety. Those highly test 
anxious persons with a lower avoidance, or stronger approach, temperament do not 
experience an excess of anxiety and do not need to move attention away from thereat stimuli 
to down regulate negative emotions. 
Our research findings are noteworthy in a number of ways. Firstly, they add to the 
growing body of evidence that suggests that threat-relevant manipulation may not always be 
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required for attention bias to be found (e.g. Abend et al., 2017; Vasey et al., 1996), especially 
when threat is presented supraliminal. This has important implications for researchers in the 
field, as this means attention bias can be measured in students with test anxiety, without 
necessarily needing complicated or time-consuming mood induction procedures. Secondly, 
the fact that students with test anxiety appeared to display attention bias even when they were 
not state anxious, indicates that attention bias is likely to be a stable characteristic of test 
anxiety, as with other anxieties (Bar-Haim et al. 2007). Thirdly, the novel incorporation of 
approach-avoidance temperament, with its moderating effect on the relationship between 
worry and attention bias, suggests that this is a characteristic that other researchers may wish 
to include when examining attention bias in other anxious populations.  Indeed, it is 
recognised that attention bias in anxious individuals can be characterised as a bias away from 
threat, as well as a bias towards threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010), and approach-avoidance 
temperament measure may help illuminate the mechanisms operating behind these different 
types of attention bias. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The main limitation of our study was, as noted above, that the mood induction 
procedure was not effective. We believe that this was possibly a result of writing about a 
previous examination and recalling deactivating emotions such as relief. Future studies 
should set out to test H1 as it is still not clear whether an attention bias to threat is larger 
under a test-threat congruent condition and whether automatic processes (e.g., vigilance for 
threat) theorised by Zeinder and Mathews (2005) in addition to, or instead of, the conscious 
processes are elicited under test-threat conditions. One option, if using the same mood 
induction procedure, would be to ask participants to recall how they felt before taking their 
last exam (i.e., so not to recall deactivating emotions) or write about an upcoming 
examination. However, since not all participants may actually have experienced an 
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examination, such an approach may not be effective. An alternative, highlighted above, 
would be to adopt the ego-threat instruction used by Putwain et al. (2011) for use with 
adolescent participants. This approach, however, uses IQ-type cognitive ability tests and so 
may not be practical for group testing. Whichever approach is used, we recommend that 
future studies incorporate post-experimental focus groups with participants to elicit feedback 
about their utility of the mood induction procedure as well as other aspects of the study. 
The second limitation to highlight is whether the dot-probe task itself is the best 
method by which to measure attention bias in test anxiety. As we note earlier, performance 
on the dot-probe task may be compromised by the cognitive-interfering nature of test anxiety. 
Building on Dong et al. (2017) who used an eye-tracking approach to measure attention bias, 
future studies should consider alternate ways to measure attention bias. Possibilities that have 
been used with trait anxiety and clinical anxiety include the simplification of the dot-probe 
task by removing two separate competing stimuli for attention in the attention cueing 
paradigm design (Fox, Russo, Bowles & Duton, 2001). Here a participant is required to 
respond to a probe presented to one side of a computer screen (as in the dot-probe task), 
however in this task, the probe is preceded by only a single stimulus cue designed to elicit 
positive, neutral or negative emotions. This allows for a single cue to attention without 
interference from a secondary cue. Fox et al. (2001) established greater attention 
disengagement difficulties with students with self-reported high state anxiety using this task. 
A further paradigm which has been suggested is the use of visual search (Hansen & 
Hansen 1988). Unlike the dot probe and spatial cueing tasks, where the stimulus of interest 
for the research is secondary to the participants’ task of responding to a probe, the visual 
search task requires participants to actively attend and respond to the content of the words. 
Participants are given a target word (i.e. test) and then see a display of words which may or 
may not contain this target. The participants’ task is to indicate if the target is present. 
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Attention bias is measured by the speed to find the target; participants who have high anxiety 
will find threat words faster (Treisman et al, 1980). We recommend that different methods of 
measuring attention bias should be used comparatively within a single study to establish their 
relative merits.  
Educational Implications 
The tendency of highly test anxious persons to direct greater allocation to threat 
stimuli may leave fewer cognitive resources available for goal directed behaviours such as 
preparing and taking an examination (see Derakshan & Eysenck, 2011; Eysenck et al., 2007). 
As a result working memory functions, including updating, shifting, and inhibition may all be 
compromised, causing interference with learning and examination performance (e.g., Owens 
et al., 2008). Interventions are required not only to reduce the distressing experience of test 
anxiety itself, but also the negative educational consequences of test anxiety. Interventions 
designed to reduce test anxiety typically employ combinations of behavioural (e.g., muscle 
relaxation) and cognitive (e.g., cognitive restructuring) approaches with study-skills training. 
Meta-analyses have shown these approaches are effective in reducing test anxiety (Ergene, 
2003; von der Embse et al., 2018). Fewer studies have investigated the dual effects of 
intervention on both test anxiety and educational achievement (Keogh, Bond, & Flaxman, 
2006;Vagg & Spielberger, 1995) and equivocal findings reported thus far; test anxiety can be 
reduced with no concurrent change in achievement and vice versa.  
Findings from the attention bias literature suggest that one way to reduce test anxiety 
would be to train students to attend to neutral or positive stimuli rather than threat stimuli. 
These training approaches, typically referred to as cognitive bias modification (CBM), 
modify dot-probe presentations such that threat stimuli are paired with neutral or positive 
stimuli and the probe always replaces the neutral or positive stimuli. CBM has been shown to 
be effective in reducing clinical anxiety (Amir, Beard, Burns & Bomyea, 2009; Hayes et al., 
TEST ANXIETY AND ATTENTION BIAS 24 
 
 
2010) and responses to natural stressors in high trait anxious persons (See et al., 2009). CBM 
has also been successfully used in an educational context to reduce interfering thoughts and 
examination stress (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2009; Dandeneau, Baldwin & Pruessner, 2007). 
We are only aware of one study to date to examine a CBM intervention for test anxiety, 
showing CBM to be equally effective as a cognitive behavioural therapy over a two-year 
period (de Hullu, Sportel, Nauta, de Jong, 2017). These highly promising findings suggest 
considerable potential for CBM as an effective intervention for test anxiety. Furthermore, by 
strengthening attention control, CBM may be more likely to negate the interfering effects on 
learning and examination performance, resulting from comprised working memory function, 
than other approaches to intervention. 
Conclusion 
 Limited by the ineffective mood induction procedure our study was not able to 
examine attention bias in a test-threat congruent situation. However, it does partly answer the 
question of whether a test-threat congruent situation is required. It would seem that it does 
not, for supraliminal stimuli (that imply conscious processes), since attention bias towards 
threat was shown by high test anxious persons in the absence of an effective threat 
manipulation. For subliminal stimuli (that imply automatic processes) an attention bias 
towards threat in the absence of an effective threat manipulation was only shown, somewhat 
paradoxically, for those participants with a strong approach tendency. It would be useful for 
future research to establish if this attention bias is larger under a test-threat condition. One of 
the challenges is to establish an effective method for artificially manipulating the level of 
test-threat to mimic that of a real-life examination.  
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Pre- and Post-writing Task State Anxiety for Test-threat and Test-neutral Conditions in High 
and Low Exam Worry Participants. 
 
 n Pre-writing Task Post-writing Task 
  M SD M SD 
      
Test-threat Condition 97 10.96 3.25 11.02 3.18 
 Low Exam Worry 44 10.61 2.82 10.39 2.62 
 High Exam worry 53 11.24 3.58 11.55 3.52 
      
Test-neutral Condition 98 10.73 3.17 10.48 3.10 
 Low Exam Worry 47 9.96 2.86 9.80 3.09 
 High Exam worry 42 11.52 3.29 11.18 2.98 






Descriptive Statistics for Worry, Approach-avoidance, Gender, Age, and Attention Bias.  
 
 Range Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Factor Loadings 
       
Worry 6-24 14.90 3.78 .03 -0.51 .49 - .69 
Approach-avoidance 20-60 37.43 6.99 -.06 0.11 .52 - .80 
Subliminal Attention Bias 20 – 2000ms -0.01 0.03 -.09 1.59 — 
Supraliminal Attention Bias 20 – 2000ms -0.01 0.04 -.16 1.61 — 






Latent Bivariate Correlations for Worry, Approach-avoidance, Gender, Age, and Attention Bias.  
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
       
1. Worry — -.49** .12 -.05 -.12 -.13 
2. Approach-avoidance  — -.20* .05 .11 -.06 
3. Gender   — .06 -.08 -.03 
4. Age    — -.01 .07 
5. Subliminal Attention Bias     — -.01 
6. Supraliminal Attention Bias      — 
       




Standardised (β) and Unstandardsied (B) Regression Coefficients from Model 1 (no Interaction Term) and Model 2 (with Interaction Term) for 
Subliminal Stimuli. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE β SE B SE β SE 
         
Gender -.13 .17 -.06 .07 -.15 .17 -.07 .07 
Age -.01 .13 -.01 .07 -.06 .13 -.02 .07 
Worry  -.16 .23 -.08 .11 -.20 .24 -.08 .12 
Approach-avoidance  .10 .20 .07 .12 .06 .22 .07 .13 








Standardised (β) and Unstandardsied (B) Regression Coefficients from Model 1 (no Interaction Term) and Model 2 (with Interaction Term) for 
Supraliminal Stimuli. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE β SE B SE β SE 
         
Gender -.10 .17 -.04 .07 -.10 .17 -.04 .07 
Age .12 .13 .07 .07 .10 .13 .06 .07 
Worry  -.46* .21 -.23* .11 -.47* .22 -.19* .09 
Approach-avoidance  -.32 .27 -.20 .14 -.37 .20 -.14 .08 
Worry ×  Approach-avoidance — — —  -.22 .34 -.06 .09 
 







Figure 1. The model implied interaction between worry and approach-avoidance on 
subliminal attention bias probed at (±1 SD).  
 
 

































Instructions for the Test-threat Condition 
Please write about the last exam that you took. You should include information about the 
exam itself, such as what subject it was for, how long it lasted, the types of questions asked 
(e.g. multiple choice or essay questions) and how important you felt that exam was for you 
personally. You should also write about how you felt before, during and after the exam. For 
example, what emotions did you experience, and why” 
Instructions for the Test-neutral Condition 
Please write about your typical journey to college. You should include basic information 
about your journey such as which form of transport you take (e.g. car, bus, walk etc.), how 
long it takes, how much it costs (if anything) and who you travel with. You should also write 
about the route you take, for example any interesting buildings that you pass on your way, or 
why you go the way that you do.” 
Instructions for the Dot-probe Task 
You will now take part in an attention task. You will see three crosses on the screen (+++), 
followed by two words, one on top of the other.  The words will disappear and an arrow will 
replace one of them.  The arrow will point left (<) or right (>). If the arrow points left press 
the A key. If the arrow points right press the L key. We are recording how quickly and 
accurately you press the correct key. Please pay attention and try to be as accurate as you can. 
You will now do 3 practice trials.  
Threat Word Stimuli used in the Dot-probe Task 
Examination, evaluated, incompetent, underachieve, incapable, overloaded, disappoint, 
rejection, unable, disastrous, failure, pressure, assessed, mistake, grading, disgrace, loser, fail, 
stress, test, wrong, shame, score, and timed. 
Neutral Word Stimuli used in the Dot-probe Task 
Electricity, personality, supermarket, helicopter, television, animation, elephant, agreement, 
broadcaster, radio, picture, cupboard, carpet, forest, toaster, rabbit, music, tree, grass, cup, oil, 
cloud, hair, and washed. 
 
